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1. Introduction 
In pursuing harmonisation in the field of international commercial trade law, it is of utmost 
importance to understand that it is constantly seeking for solutions and practice standards that will 
lead to legal certainty and predictable outcomes. This is due to the fact that the world is developing 
and evolving at exponential rates, that there is a need for international commercial law to keep up 
with the times. With the world changing and the arrival of Industry 4.0 introducing high end level 
technological advancements and enhanced globalisation, merchants, traders and businessmen 
cannot afford to be hindered and restrained on obsolete problems and obstacles, that still continue to 
exist in international commerce, as we enter a new digital era. It goes without saying that it is 
important to understand and fully respect fundamental values and principles that underlie the field 
of international commercial law and for this reason it is the duty and important responsibility for 
international commercial lawyers to set the precedent that give effect and life to these said values 
and principles. One such underlying fundamental value is the principle of party autonomy. Given 
the unique structure and nature of international trade law, that derived from the lex mercatoria, 
party autonomy seemed to offer the simple solution of ending the problematic and precarious 
obstacles found within the international trade market and its legal aspects too. Yet we are still 
unable to resolve most of these issues. It is understandable why these problems exist given the 
difficult position in which private international law is placed, which is complicatedly situated in 
between public and private law.   
This essay will discuss the non-recognition of tacit choice of law in China and Taiwan, excluding 
Hong Kong  and Macau,  since these jurisdictions do recognise tacit choice of law. The principle of 1 2
party autonomy will be explored and analysed along with its importance in the context of 
commercial private international law. The paper will then look at concepts of express and tacit 
choice of law in respect of commercial contracts in international commercial law, followed by a 
thorough analytical overview and exploration of the historical and current position of private 
international law rules regarding party autonomy, in particular express and tacit choice of law in 
China and Taiwan, respectively. The paper will thereafter discuss a hypothetical scenario in which 
 Wolff “Hong Kong” 2017 Encyclopedia of Private International Law 2135. “Hong Kong’s Private international law 1
follows the common law proper law of contract rule. Consequently, contracts are subject to the law chosen by the 
parties either expressly or impliedly.”
 Tu “Macau” 2017 Encyclopedia of Private International Law 2310 and see article 40(1) of Macau Civil Code which 2
stipulate that “contractual obligations ‘are subject to the law explicitly or implicitly chosen by the parties’”.
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China and Taiwan were to consider using the Hague Principles as a model law in this regard. The 
final section of the paper will critically discuss pros and cons as to whether or not tacit choice of 
law is necessary and use the position of China and Taiwan to support the argument that non-
recognition of tacit choice of law is viable and could even potentially be a more beneficial approach 
in private international law. 
1.1 Party autonomy 
The principle of party autonomy is a long established principle that is very well-known at this point 
in time, and throughout history, many authors have given their own descriptions of what party 
autonomy is in context of international commercial and private international law. Party autonomy is 
“the most widely accepted private international rule of our time”;  it has even been described as a 3
“fundamental right”  and “irresistible principle”  that is so well endorsed that, “virtually nobody is 4 5
against it”.  In essence, party autonomy is the principle which gives parties to a contract the 6
freedom to select a law or legal system to govern their commercial contract.  It is seen as the 7
manifestation of freedom of contract,  the cornerstone for contracts in conflicts of law theory and “a 8
rule of law currently embodied in the private international laws of almost all countries”.  9
Party autonomy is regarded as a crucial and essential value in cross-border transactions, sought to 
bring harmonisation and unification into international trade practices. That is why there is a 
sweeping desire and interest in the valuing and support for choice of law instruments. The principle 
of party autonomy contains, “two fundamental and interrelated elements: autonomy and mutuality” 
where “the exercise of the autonomy must be based on mutuality.”  These elements have gained 10
 Symeonides “Party Autonomy in International Contracts and the Multiple Ways of Slicing the Apple” 2014 Brooklyn 3
Journal of International Law 1123.
 See n 3 above.4
 Symeonides (n3) at 1124.5
 See n 5 above.. 6
 Junming “Choice of Law for Contracts in China: A Proposal for the Objectivisation of Standards and Their Use in 7
Conflicts of Law” 1996 Indiana International & Comparative Law Review 440.
 Liang Party Autonomy in Contractual Choice of Law in China 2018 1.8
 See n 7 above.9
 Levin “The Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts: Enhancing Party Autonomy 10
in a Globalized Market” 2016 New York University Journal of Law & Business 273. See also Zhang “Contractual 
Choice of Law in Contracts of Adhesion and Party Autonomy” 2008 AKRON Law Review 123, 130.
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Dalhuisen suggested a thinking in private law and the new lex mercatoria which was “not statist, 
therefore not territorial, but [which] emanates …. from the international commercial and financial 
legal order that businessmen maintain amongst themselves”.  This would result in an outcome 20
where “custom and industry practices, party autonomy and international general principles retake 
their place, as autonomous sources of transnational law, although combined in and still subject to 
the public order requirements of international commercial and financial legal order itself”.  21
Dalhuisen’s thesis correctly reflects the reality of what commercial private international law is and 
looks like today. Various initiatives were taken towards the formalising unification of international 
commercial law in hopes of building a new lex mercatoria,  where various intergovernmental 22
organisations emerged such as UNCITRAL,  the Hague Conference on Private International Law 23
(HCCH) and UNIDROIT.  In addition, various Conventions were created and entered into by 24
several States all over the world to bring about harmonisation and unification into this unique field 
of commercial law such as the CISG or Vienna Sales Convention.  The significance is that States 25
from all over the world who are Members, would then have to develop their private international 
law rules accordingly to such conventions. The act of enacting, endorsing and enforcing the 
contents of these Conventions would result in harmonisation and unification of the field of private 
international law bringing in legal certainty and predictability. 
Party autonomy became a highly celebrated principle that is encouraged and followed by these 
various institutional organisations, such as the HCCH which referred to party autonomy as a 
standardised international best practice.  Party autonomy, being widely accepted globally, allowed 26
private actors to commercial transactions to freely choose whatever terms and conditions they see 
fit to be incorporated into their contract. These terms ranged from which court would have 
 Dalhuisen Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law 2007 284.20
 See n 20 above.. 21
 Dalhuisen (n20) at 285.22
 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.23
 The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law.24
 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980.25
 Khanderia “Indian private international law vis-à-vis party autonomy in the choice of law” 2018 Oxford University 26
Commonwealth Law Journal 9, 12, 15. See also Khanderia “The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
and the Enforcement of forum-selection clauses in Indian private international law 2019 International Journal of 
Private Law 130. 
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jurisdiction, i.e. choice of court clauses, to which law or legal system would be applicable to govern 
their contract in the event of a dispute, i.e. choice of law clauses. Nevertheless, party autonomy is 
still subject to certain qualifications or limitations,  such as the public policy standards within the 27
international community such as public order and mandatory overriding provisions which are 
protective measures implemented with the aim of protecting the interests of the general public of a 
country. With this freedom to choose, private actors in international commercial relations would not 
suffer detriments from restrictions placed by public law, statist or territorial political ordeals since 
their choices are upheld and respected, limited only within the boundaries of mandatory overriding 
provisions and ordre public. 
1.2 Applicable law 
It it important to determine the applicable law in international contracts because, “contracts are 
incapable of existing in a legal vacuum,”  and “are mere pieces of paper devoid of all legal effect 28
unless they were made by reference to some system of private law which defines the obligations 
assumed by the parties to the contract by their use of particular forms of words and prescribes the 
remedies enforceable in a court of justice for failure to perform any of those obligations”.  For this 29
reason alone, ascertaining the applicable law in an international commercial contract has gained 
much importance. However, the determination of the applicable law proves to be quite difficult in 
reality, since an international commercial contract can lead to a “multiplicity of connecting factors 
[with] each pointing to different legal systems”.  One of the first approaches used in determining 30
the applicable law in international contracts, is to see whether or not the parties to the contract have 
agreed on a choice of law either expressly or tacitly. 
 Bauerfeld “Effectiveness of Choice-of-Law Clauses in Contract Conflicts of Law: Part︎y Autonomy︎ or Objective 27
Determination?” 1982 Columbia Law Review 1661.
 Bouwers “Tacit Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts - A Turkish Study” 2016 Scientific 28
Cooperations 2nd International Conference on Social Sciences 170.
 See n 28 above. See also Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v Kuwait Insurance Co 1984 AC 50 at 65.29
 See n 28 above.30
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1.2.1 Express and tacit choice of law 
One way to fully manifest and utilise the principle of party autonomy is through expressly or tacitly 
choosing the applicable law to govern a certain international contract between parties, since “the 
influence of party autonomy in choice of law has become so great that it is sometimes suggested 
that [the parties] intentions are the very foundation of all choice of law rules in contract.”  As party 31
autonomy is widely accepted in many countries, “the first rule is to have regard to the parties’ 
choice of law”.  Parties can state their intentions expressly, during the concluding of the contract, 32
which legal system they wish to govern their contract, this is also known as the proper law.  33
Express choice of law by parties to an international contract will be upheld in countries that 
recognise and accept party autonomy which, in addition, assists in avoiding and preventing many 
obstacles in the determination of the proper law or applicable law to a contract. By carrying out this 
practice, namely upholding party autonomy by means of express choice of law, legal certainty and 
predictability are promoted, together with harmonisation, unification in the law and  the confidence 
of parties conducting international commercial transactions, namely that their choices will be 
respected and preserved. 
However, there are instances where such express choice is omitted from being recorded in the 
contract. Thus emerged the concept of tacit choice of law. Tacit choice of law is described as still 
being “a true or real choice of law”,  but one “which was not made expressly”.  Tacit choice 34 35
connotes a form of communication, “….even more, about flawed communication between partners 
in commercial cross-border transactions.”  Essentially these are instances where parties to a cross-36
border contract fail to properly stipulate the applicable proper law to govern their contract.  37
Already with the various potential problems that occur or could occur in international commercial 
dealings, tacit choice of law adds more uncertainty and unpredictable outcomes in the context of 
 Mills Party Autonomy in Private International Law 2018 315.31
 See n 28 above. 32
 See n 28 above.33
 Neels and Fredericks “Tacit choice of law in the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Contracts” 2011 34
De Jure 104.
 See n 34 above.35
 Gama “Tacit Choice of law in the Hague Principles”  2017 Uniform law review renvue de droit uniforme 336.36
 See n 36 above.37
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cross-border transactional contracts. Nevertheless, it is admitted that, for various valid reasons, the 
reality is that the parties to a contract may fail to properly communicate their intentions regarding 
the applicable law explicitly in their contract.  In instances where such omission has taken place, 38
“the judge or arbitrator may be called to reveal such intent”.  This then means that a court will, 39
“attempt to determine the parties’ unexpressed or tacit choice of law”  and “in the absence of a 40
tacit choice, the court must assign the objective proper law to the contract”.   41
In realising the complexities attached to tacit choice of law, there has been large efforts in many 
conventions and many countries to accommodate for the recognition and giving effect of tacit 
choice of law. This approach of trying to give full expression to the doctrine of party autonomy, 
may, however prove to be disadvantageous to certainty in commercial private international law. 
This is due to the fact that, internationally speaking, there is divergence with regards to the manner 
of how each different country determines the existence of tacit choice of law. For instance, the laws 
in some countries, such as China,  and Peru,  seem more restricting since they limit choice of law 42 43
to only that of express choice of law, making no room and accommodation for tacit choice.  Other 44
countries, such as the USA and Algeria, do not preclude parties from making a tacit choice of law 
since “nothing prevents them from impliedly choosing the law. [However], no criteria are provided 
to determine the [implied or tacit] law so chosen”.  Other jurisdictions, such as Quebec, Russia, 45
Argentina and Korea, not only provide accommodating rules on tacit choice “but also set out the 
criteria by which the judge or arbitrator shall determine the law tacitly chosen by the parties”.  This 46
divergence in the recognition of tacit choice of law around the world causes problematic 
 See n 36 above.38
 Gama (n36) at 341.39
 Bouwers “Tacit choice of law in international commercial contracts - The position in South African law and under the 40
Rome I Regulation” Transnational Impacts on Law:Perspectives from South Africa and Germany Augsburger 
Rechtsstudien 70.
 See n 40 above.41
 Discussed further in detail below.42
 Civil Code of the Republic of Peru which was enacted on 24 July 1984. Title III provides for Applicable Law for 43
Contractual Obligations containing Article 2095 which  provides that, “[c]ontractual obligations are governed by the 
law expressly chosen by the parties and, failing that, by the law of the place of performance. However, if they are to be 
performed in different countries, they are governed by the law of the principal obligation and, if this cannot be 
determined, by the law of the place of celebration.If the place of performance is not expressly established or it cannot 
unequivocally be implied from the character of the obligation, the law of the place of celebration applies.”
 Gama (n36) at 341 - 342.44
 Gama (n36) at 342.45
 See n 45 above.46
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uncertainties within the commercial private international law aspect. In addition, another problem 
lies within the “notion of inferring an actual intention [which] is based upon making assumptions 
that may or may not be correct”.  The act of concluding the existence of a real choice in the 47
absence of express choice, without sufficient information to be sure of its correctness, “may have 
undesirable consequences for the parties to the contract, as their reasonable expectations will not 
necessarily be portrayed in the inferences drawn by the court”.  This would ultimately result in 48
more problems as it invites more uncertainty and unpredictability within the branch of commercial 
private international law. 
For purposes of this paper, an in depth analysis will be made of tacit choice of law. Specifically 
with reference to the relevance of tacit choice of law, which will be discussed in juxtaposition to the 
two jurisdictions, China and Taiwan, which do not recognise tacit choice in their private 
international laws. Most jurisdictions all over the world recognise tacit choice of law as it is a 
means to curb complications that follow the non-recognition of tacit choice, in relation to party 
autonomy and party expectation. However, is party expectation and the principle of party autonomy 
fully respected when recognising tacit choice of law? This question needs to be asked since there 
exists the slight potential for uncertainty when it comes to the determination of whether or not a 
tacit choice of law exists. The unease created by the guesstimates made by courts in the process of 
determining the existence of tacit choice is due to a lack of guidance and detail provided by private 
international rules on the matter relating to the applicable law. Thus, the purpose of this dissertation 
is to investigate the concept of tacit choice of law by looking at the outcomes that have followed in 
China and Taiwan’s non-recognition of tacit choice of law. 
 Bouwers (n40) at 71.47
 See n 47 above.48
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2. The legal position in China and Taiwan 
There is a total of four countries whose private international laws do not recognise tacit choice of 
law, these include China and Taiwan. The private international laws of these two countries will now 
be critically discussed. 
2.1 China  
2.1.1 Historic overview 
In China, the legal position on choice of law has come an extremely long way to reach the position 
where it is today, with both judicial practice and legislation in the area of choice of law still being 
“imperfect but not as complex and unmanageable as many foreigners suppose”.  The background 49
in China is that “choice of law rules barely existed in China prior to 1986, when the General 
Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China was adopted.”  From 1949 to 1986 50
China only tackled choice of law in very few consular treaties between itself and other countries, 
which dealt mainly with laws that govern property.  The development of China’s private 51
international law rules throughout history with regards to choice of law and party autonomy in 
China has ultimately impacted in the influencing and shaping of China’s choice of law rules today. 
i. The development of China’s private international law rules 
The development of China’s private international law only began in 1985, when the principle of 
party autonomy was first recognised and received into the choice of law rules by the Foreign 
Economic Contract Law legislation.  Its article 5(1), providing that “parties to a [foreign-related 52
economic] contract may choose the proper law applicable to the settlement of contract disputes”,  53
 Junming (n7) at 439.49
 Zhang “Codified Choice of Law in China: Rules, Processes and Theoretical Underpinnings” 2011 North Carolina 50
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 85.
 Zhang (n50) at 86.51
 Liang (n8) at 7. See also Law of the People's Republic of China on Economic Contracts Involving Foreign Interest, 52
March 21, 1985.
 See n 7 above.53
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was a huge step taken and achieved in the history of China’s private international law.  This 54
recognition of party autonomy in international commercial undertakings was later recapitulated in 
article 145 of the General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China (Chinese 
Civil Law), which came into effect on January 1, 1986, stipulating that “the parties to a contract 
involving foreign interest may choose the law applicable to settlement of their contract disputes, 
except as otherwise stipulated by law.”   55
There were progressive steps taken and adopted in order “to improve the legal environment in 
China”.  However these actions amounted to, what was considered at the time, partial acceptance 56
of party autonomy.  It was seen as partial because Chinese individuals could not partake in foreign 57
related contractual transactions, only Chinese and foreign enterprises could conduct these affairs.  58
Furthermore, there were shortcomings which lead to confusion in respect of the language used in 
article 145,  where the rules that concerned party autonomy in the statutory instruments mentioned 59
were “all very abstract.”  Confusion resulted from the fact that, even though party autonomy was 60
generally accepted, it was still subject to certain exceptions that were “otherwise stipulated by 
law”,  such as article 5(2) of the Foreign Economic Contract Law, which provided that “Chinese 61
law should apply to contracts performed within the territory of China.”  62
In order to remedy the confusion and provide more guidance and clarity, the Supreme People’s 
Court (SPC) provided two judicial documents with regards to the applicable law for these 
contractual instances.  The first interpretational supplementary document was the Response to 63
Certain Questions Concerning the Application of Foreign Economic Contract Law (1987 
 See n 52 above.54
 See n 7 above. 55
 See n 7 above.56
 See n 52 above. 57
 See n 52 above. 58
 See n 7 above.59
 See n 52 above.60
 Article 269 of Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China which was promulgated at the 28th Meeting of the 61
Standing Committee of the 7th NPC on 7 November 1992 and became effective on 1 July 1993. See also n 52 above.
 See n 52 above.62
 Liang (n8) at 8.63
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Response).  The second issued document was called The Opinions concerning Implementation and 64
Application of the General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(Provisional) (1988 Opinions).  This instrument provided what was called, the evasion of law 65
exception. This exception laid down that, “if the parties selected a foreign law with the intent to 
evade Chinese law that otherwise must be applied, the parties’ choice of law would be void.”  66
This was the “framework under which the principle of party autonomy was applied in this period”  67
for choice of law in China. The fundamental legal framework and legal scheme for choice of law in 
China was and still is constituted by all the relevant rules provided for in legislation and the 
regulations made by the SPC.  The SPC used these interpretational instruments in a 68
complementary manner when interpreting how the choice of law rules, found in the relevant 
legislations and regulations, are to be applied.  69
ii. Complete party autonomy and the Chinese Contract Law 
Following the partial acceptance of party autonomy in China, the Chinese Contract Law (CCL) was 
enacted in 1999 which superseded the Foreign Economics Contract Law,  where the complete 70
acceptance of party autonomy in Chinese Private International Law took place.  Complete party 71
autonomy provided by the CCL meant that Chinese individuals were allowed “to become parties to 
contracts involving foreign elements.”  In addition, article 126 of the CCL repeat the same terms as 72
 See n 63 above. It was issued on 19 October 1987 by the SPC. Though the Contract Law has been effective since 1 64
October 1999, it was not until 2000 that the 1987 Response was formally invalidated by the SPC. The latest 
Interpretation of the SPC (Interpretation (I) of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Questions Relating to the 
Application of the Laws to Civil Relationships Involving a Foreign Element 2012) contains no detailed guidance in 
relation to choice of law except for in Article 6 and 7 which deals with the validity of choice.
 See n 63 above. It was issued on 2 April 1988 by the SPC.65
 See n 63 above. Article 194 of the 1988 Opinions reads: ‘In case any party has any act of evading the mandatory or 66
prohibitive legal provisions of our country, the foreign law shall not be applied. 
 See n 63 above. 67
 See n 63 above. 68
 Zhang (n50) at 87.69
 Liang (n8) at 9. 70
See n 70 above.71
 Article 2 of the Contract Law confirms that natural persons are also legitimate parties of a contract. It provides: ‘For 72
purposes of this Law, a contract is an agreement between natural persons, legal persons or other organisations with 
equal standing, for the purpose of establishing, altering, or discharging a relationship of civil rights and obligations.’ 
See also n 70 above
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those enshrined in article 5(1) of the Foreign Economics Contract Law.  With the enactment of the 73
Chinese Contract Law a momentous achievement was accomplished in China’s private international 
law legislation, which, along with the accompaniment of article 145 of the Chinese Civil Law, 
resulted in a complete acceptance of party autonomy in contractual choice of law.   74
An example where complete party autonomy, regarding choice of law in China, was respected and 
upheld was in the case of Shengli Shipping Co. (Germany) v. Junye International Trade Co. Ltd. 
(Tianjin).  The court in this case took into consideration the choice of both parties where they had 75
cited the Chinese Maritime Code  and the Civil Law of China, leading to the conclusion that both 76
parties had mutually agreed on and chosen Chinese law as the applicable law. Most importantly, this 
choice was a true reflection of their real intent which was thus respected and upheld.  This case 77
indicated a progressive milestone reached under the general legal framework in China’s private 
international law, however there were still “important issues that remained unsolved.”  One of such 78
issues is found in the case of Shenglun Import and Export Co. Ltd. v. Tianjin-Inchon International 
Passenger & Cargo Co. Ltd. and Tianjin-Inchon International Passenger & Cargo Co. Ltd. 
(Tianjin).  The parties in this case had included a clause in the bill of lading which stipulated that 79
in the event of a dispute arising in respect of the bill, such dispute shall be resolved according to the 
law of England.  However, the People’s Court had decided that the law of China was applicable 80
instead, for reasons being that “neither of the parties invoked the law of other jurisdictions or 
submitted relevant evidence of that law to the court during the proceedings [thus] in this case, the 
parties were assumed to have changed their choice, which seemed against their real intent.”  This 81
decision is problematic since it was not required that the parties plead foreign law.  The People’s 82
Court had, in this case, failed to first consider the validity of the choice of law clause in accordance 
 Tu Private International Law in China 2016 70. See also n 52 above.73
 Liang (n8) at 10.74
 30 January 2002, Tianjin Higher People’s Court.75
 See n 62 above.76
 Liang (n8) at 11.77
 See n 74 above. 78
 30 July 2002, Tianjin Maritime Court.79
 See n 77 above.80
 See n 77 above.81
 See n 77 above.82
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to the rules contained in the Civil Law of China and the CCL.  Application of foreign law would 83
only be considered after the court reached a conclusion that foreign law be applied. However, in the 
Shenglun case the court had visibly neglected this step and went directly to the decision that “the 
parties had failed to prove the content of foreign law [thus] Chinese law should be applied.”  84
iii. The Provisions on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Trials of Foreign-
Related Civil and Commercial Contract Disputes  
The SPC furnished the Provisions of Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Trials of 
Foreign-Related Civil and Commercial Contract Disputes (2007 Provisions),  to confront the 85
above-mentioned issue concerning the application of party autonomy in China’s judicial practice.   86
The 2007 Provisions contained requirements provided by article 3 that “the choice of law and the 
change of this choice should be express.”  In addition, article 4(2) provides when “the parties have 87
not selected the law applicable to their contract dispute but both cite the law of the same country or 
region and neither has raised an objection to the applicable law, they shall be deemed to have made 
a selection as to the law applicable to their contract dispute”.  The purpose of having both these 88
provisions was because the courts in China have completely accepted that the making of such 
choice of law should be express,  and in instances where the parties have not made a choice, “but 89
the plaintiff takes a certain country’s law as the legal basis for his pleadings, and the defendant 
raises no objection and also defends according to the law of that same country, that law would be 
treated as the law chosen by the parties.”  Yet in judicial practice, inconsistencies occur more often 90
than not because the courts fail to illustrate the practices provided in articles 3 and 4, by not clearly 
distinguishing between the parties’ tacit choice of law and the inferences made by the judge on the 
applicable law.  91
 See n 77 above.83
 See n 77 above.84
 It was issued on 23 July 2007, became effective on 8 August 2007, and was invalidated by the SPC in 2013. 85
 Liang (n8) at 14.86
 See n 86 above.87
 See n 86 above.88
 See n 86 above.89
 Liang (n8) at 15.90
 See n 90 above.91
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The 2007 Provisions had provided helpful clarifications regarding choice of law, which is to be 
made expressly, as well as the modification of such choice by way of a later agreement. 
Nevertheless, the 2007 Provisions still could not solve certain existing issues and in some way 
created more confusion in other areas of Chinese private international law, which need not be 
touched on for purposes of this paper. However, these issues then lead to the issuing of the 2010 
Conflicts Statute, which constitutes the current position of private international law in China. 
2.1.2 Current private international law position in China - the 2010 Conflicts Statute  
After eight years of discussing and drafting, the Law on the Application of Laws to Foreign-related 
Civil Relationships, known as the 2010 Conflicts Statute, was enacted on 28 October 2010 by the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC). They came into effect on 1 April 
2011.  Contained in article 1 of the 2010 Conflicts Statute is the provision stipulating that its 92
enactment is to provide clarification with regards to “the application of law in foreign-related civil 
relationships, reasonably solve foreign-related civil disputes, and protect the legal rights and 
interests of parties.”  Chapter 1 of the Statute contains the principle of party autonomy, thus 93
making it a general principle in the private international law of China.  Regarding the principle of 94
party autonomy, it should be mentioned that two categories are excluded from the scope, namely 
consumer contracts and labour contracts.  95
Choice of law rules in China are granted pursuant to article 3 of the 2010 Conflicts Statute which 
pertains to the express choice of law only and does not contain any mention of tacit choice of law, 
as the provision stipulates that “the parties may explicitly choose the law applicable to their foreign 
related civil relation in accordance with the provisions of this law.” If such choice is not made 
expressly, then the courts in China have no other option but to consider it as an absence of choice. 
Article 41 provides that, “absent any choice by the parties, the law of the habitual residence of a 
 Liang (n8) at 2 and 18.92
 Liang (n8) at 18.93
 See n 93 above94
 See n 93 above. Contained in article 42 in respect of consumer contracts and article 43 in respect of labour contracts.95
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party whose performance of obligation is most characteristic of the contract or the law that is most 
closely connected with the contract shall be applied”.   96
2.1.3 Tacit choice of law in China  
The position in China’s private international law rules regarding tacit choice of law is that China 
does not recognise tacit choice of law. Although this position seems rather clear and 
straightforward, in judicial practice it is rather different. In addition, various Chinese private 
international law academic authors have opined differently with regards to the tacit choice of law 
rules in China.  
Mo Zhang, on the one hand, addressed the arrangement regarding express choice of law in China. 
He states that in terms of choice of law, the intention of parties “may not be assumed through the 
interpretation of the terms of the contract or by looking at an established course of dealing between 
parties”.  In other words, the parties’ intentions on the applicable law may not be inferred or 97
implied by, for example, choice of forum agreements made by the parties.  He further goes on to 98
say that, “the requirement for an express choice of law has become a well-settled judicial rule in 
determining of the validity of the choice of law by the parties to a contract”,  as stipulated in the 99
SPC 1987 Response. Zhang is an advocate for the private international law rules that currently 
stand in China concerning tacit choice of law; he asserts that choice of law agreements “must be 
expressly made by the parties with mutual consent and may not be implied”,  as provided for by 100
both the Chinese Civil Law 1986 and the Chinese Contract Law 1999. If such choice is not made 
expressly then the law applied shall be that of the country most closely connected to the contract.  101
He explains that the choice of law rules in China are not “unified”, in fact as seen in the discussion 
 Nishitani “Party Autonomy in Contemporary Private International Law - The Hague Principles on Choice of Law and 96
East Asia” 2016 Japanese Yearbook of International Law 21. See also Tu and Xu “Contractual Conflicts in the People's 
Republic of China: The Applicable Law in the Absence of Choice” 2015 Journal of Private International Law 182, 183. 
See also Chen “China” 2017 Encyclopedia of Private International Law 1977.
 Zhang “Choice of law in contracts: Chinese approach” 2006 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 97
317. See also Zhang (n51) at 118 - 119.
 See n 87 above.98
 See n 97 above.99
 Zhang “International Civil Litigation in China: A Practical Analysis of the Chinese Judicial System” 2002  Boston 100
College International & Comparative Law Review 78.
See n 100 above.101
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above, they are “scattered” into many different legislations and regulations, with the most important 
choice of law rules being found in the Chinese Civil Law and CCL.  In addition, Zhang is aware 102
of the criticism and dissatisfaction behind the “scattered” and “incomplete” nature of the choice of 
law rules in China. This lead to the publication of the Model law, the China Society of Private 
International Law, which was made as an “attempt to codify the choice-of-law rules”.  However 103
Zhang goes on to say that in China, as a traditional civil law country, “the people’s courts may only 
apply the ‘black letter’ rules”,  meaning that no matter how significant a Model Law is, it “may 104
not become applicable unless and until it is adopted by the Chinese legislature”.  105
Guangjian Tu, on the other hand, is of the opinion that the non-recognition of tacit choice of law 
“will certainly go against the principle of party autonomy in some cases and can be regarded as 
‘rigid’”.  He states that the practice by the courts is that, “if one party invoked the substantive law 106
of a state and the other party did not raise objection …[then] it had been decided that it should be 
inferred that the parties had implicitly chosen the substantive law of that state as the governing law 
for their contract”.  Furthermore he adds that in instances where “both parties invoked the 107
substantive law of the same state”,  assuming this is a reference to article 4 of the 2007 108
Provisions,  this serves as an indication that the parties have made a tacit choice of law to govern 109
their contract. Tu supports the recognition for tacit choice and contends that there is evidence that in 
practice the courts in China do give effect to implied choice of law. He substantiates this view by 
contending that there is a theoretical problem in the fact that article 3 of the 2010 Conflicts Statute 
along with the 2007 Provision provide that only explicit choice is permissible, when in practice, 
“one kind of exemplary implicit choice has been accepted”.  However, it is contended by Liang 110
 Zhang (n100) at 75.102
 Zhang (n100) at 77.103
 See n 100 above.104
 See n 100 above.105
 Tu (n73) at 77.106
 Tu (n73) at 76. See also Changjiang Economic Combined Development (Group) GmbH Chongqing Company v. 107
Orient Choice Limited (2007) Yu High Court Civ Final No. 250 and SHL Import and Export GmbH v. Beijing Juejin 
BIS Group (2004) Gao Min Zhongzi No. 1486 (Judgment of Beijing High People’s Court on final Appeal). 
 See n 107 above.108
 Article 4(2) provides ‘if the parties have not selected the law applicable to their contract dispute but both cite the law 109
of the same country or region and neither has raised an objection to the applicable law, they shall be deemed to have 
made a selection as to the law applicable to their contract dispute’.
 See n 107 above. 110
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that in the 2007 Provisions article 4 and article 3 contradict each other since invoking the “law of 
the same origin is obviously different from arriving at an express choice of law agreement”.  111
Furthermore Liang contended that article 4(2) was not necessary since in these instances: “If both of 
the parties invoke the same law as the governing law of their contract, all the judge has to do is to 
enquire the both of them and verify whether a new agreement has been concluded.”  Tu 112
acknowledges that tacit choice of law in China may not be fully recognised in the near future, 
however he supports the suggestion that the rigidity of this rule regarding tacit choice, should be 
relaxed.  113
Other authors such as Xiao and Long are also of the opinion that a tacit choice of law may be made 
and recognised provided that, “it can be clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the 
circumstances of the case”.  This approach is similar to the proposition widely followed in many 114
other different countries. Both authors contend that, to a certain degree, there is support for this 
suggestion found within article 4 of the 2007 Provisions. They argue that article 4 provides for 
circumstances, “in which a choice of law can reasonably be implied”.  They further added that the 115
general wording of the Draft Statute on the Law Applicable to Civil Relationship Involving Foreign 
Elements in terms of “parties’ choice of law in contracts seems to anticipate that a choice of law 
might be implied in various circumstances”.  However, there has been no further guidance on 116
what those circumstance may be.  Luo Junming adds that in actuality tacit choice of the applicable 117
law is practiced in China since the use of tacit choice of law was not barred by the law.  Junming 118
goes onto explain that express choice will have the effect of honouring parties’ intention, however, 
refusing to acknowledge a choice of law made tacitly is not reasonable solely based on the failure 
that it was not made expressly.  In contrast to the views expressed by Zhang, Junming provides 119
that the determination of tacit choice of law made by parties can be done by examining, “the 
 See n 90 above. 111
 Seen n 90 above.112
 See n 107 above. 113
 Xiao and Long “Contractual Party Autonomy in Chinese Private International Law” 2009 Yearbook of Private 114
International Law 198.
 See n 114 above.115
 See n 114 above.116
 See n 114 above.117
 Junming (n7) at 442.118
 See n 118 above.119
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content and nature of the provisions of the contract… along with the accepted customs and 
practices of business and convenience, the language of the contract, and the presence of a 
jurisdiction clause”.  He goes on to illustrate that, “[s]uch a jurisdiction clause may specify that 120
any litigation or arbitration undertaken in a certain country may provide a basis for the inference 
that the parties intended the law of that country to govern.”  121
With differing views of these academic authors, with regards to the legal position in China, as well 
as their different interpretations of the legal rules, there seem to be mixed and diverging views on 
the non-recognition of tacit choice of law in China. Another country which does not recognise tacit 
choice of law and which will be looked at is Taiwan. 
2.2 Taiwan  
2.2.1. Historical overview 
Taiwan, as a civil law country, has its conflict of law rules encompassed in a single statute namely, 
the Act Governing the Application of Laws in Civil Matters Involving Foreign Elements which was 
enacted in 1953 (hereinafter AAL).  The historical background behind the development of private 122
international law in the Republic of China, Taiwan (Taiwan) began when Taiwan politically moved 
away and split from China, since the civil war when the Chinese Communist Party took over on the 
Mainland of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 October 1.   123
In 1918 the Republic of China had passed the Statute on Application of Law (Statute 1918) which 
comprehensively addressed issues that contained foreign elements.  This Statute of 1918 was, due 124
to the division which occurred in the Republic of China following the civil war, replaced by the 
AAL,  which exclusively dealt with cases containing foreign elements in Taiwan.  Furthermore, 125 126
 See n 118 above.120
 See n 118 above.121
 https://archivos.juridicas.unam.mx/www/bjv/libros/6/2843/51.pdf  (01/07/2020).122
 Chen “The Recent Development of Private International Law in Taiwan” 2014 Codification In East Asia 234.123
 See n 123 above.124
 See n 123 above.125
 See n 123 above. 126
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two additional pieces of legislation were passed to handle cases which involved “elements of other 
sister ‘domestic’ areas or regions.”  This referred to instances where there were elements 127
involving Mainland China, which meant that “the applicable law shall be decided in accordance 
with the Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area of 
1992”,  with Chapter 3 (Articles 41 through to 74) providing the rules for conflict of laws between 128
the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.  Other instances involving either the state of Hong Kong 129
or Macau, “the Act Governing Relations with Hong Kong and Macau of 1997 provides that the 
provisions of AAL shall apply mutatis mutandis to any question pertaining to conflict of laws 
between Taiwan and the two areas (Article 38).”  Rong-Chwan Chen stated that these conflict of 130
law legislations in Taiwan, “form a unique conflicts system to reflect the historic development of 
political confrontation and compromise.”  131
i. Conflict of laws in Taiwan 
Due to her unique international status, Taiwan has comparatively little to few opportunities to enter 
into international conflicts conventions, thus the amount of participation in international conflicts 
conventions is close to zero.  Nevertheless, even with the limited status, these Conventions still 132
have an influence on Taiwan’s domestic laws. The contents contained in these treaties can still be 
incorporated into Taiwan’s domestic laws, as it has been mentioned by the Grand Justice “that once 
the treaties have been passed by the domestic legislation procedures, they hold the same status as 
laws.”  Thus the implementation of provisions in international conflicts conventions are not due to 133
Taiwan’s treaty obligations, since Taiwan is not a member to most Conventions, but are merely 
because these conventions are sources of reference in Taiwan’s private international law.  134
 See n 123 above. 127
 Chen (n123) at 235.128
 See n 128 above.129
 See n 128 above.130
 See n 128 above. 131
 See n 122 above at 3.132
 See n 132 above.133
 See n 122 above at 4.134
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2.2.2. The AAL and the 2007 Draft of Taiwan Conflicts Act   
The AAL remained the same and had not been amended since its enactment in 1953, which meant 
that it contained some provisions which had become outdated and were even considered 
“inappropriate”.  This then instigated the Judicial Yuan to initiate an amendment of the Act and 135
thus a Committee of experts were called to start working on it in 1998.  The Committee concluded 136
its workings “in December 2007 and the official Draft of the Amendment of the Act Governing the 
Application of Laws in Civil Matters Involving Foreign Elements [was] ready for the review [by] 
the legislative branch (hereinafter the 2007 Draft of Taiwan Conflicts Act).”  It is clear that 137
international conflicts conventions do indeed have an indirect impact on the domestic laws in 
Taiwan, such as the AAL and the 2007 Draft, which can be seen when comparing the similarities 
and differences between these conventions and Taiwan’s domestic laws.  138
In terms of determining the applicable law in international sale of goods, in Taiwan, the Convention 
that provided many influential fundamental principles in this aspect was the 1986 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.  Article 7 139
provided that the law applicable shall first be determined by the law selected by the parties 
expressly or tacitly with a clear demonstration.  In the absence of such agreement, the applicable 140
law would then be that of the law of the place where the seller has his place of business at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract in principle by virtue of article 8(1),  but shall be the law of the 141
 See n 122 above at 2.135
 See n 135 above.136
 See n 135 above.137
 See n 122 above at 8.138
 See n 138 above.139
Article 7 (1)  A contract of sale is governed by the law chosen by the parties. The parties' agreement on this choice 140
must be express or be clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract and the conduct of the parties, viewed in their 
entirety. Such a choice may be limited to a part of the contract; Article 7(2)  The parties may at any time agree to subject 
the contract in whole or in part to a law other than that which previously governed it, whether or not the law previously 
governing the contract was chosen by the parties. Any change by the parties of the applicable law made after the 
conclusion of the contract does not prejudice its formal validity or the rights of third parties.
 Provides that, “[t]o the extent that the law applicable to a contract of sale has not been chosen by the parties in 141
accordance with Article 7, the contract is governed by the law of the State where the seller has his place of business at 
the time of conclusion of the contract.”
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place where the buyer has his place of business at the time of the conclusion of the contract in 
certain exceptional circumstances by virtue of article 8(2).   142
Comparing the rules contained in this convention to that of Taiwan, the AAL does not contain 
specific conflict of law rules in respect of sales of goods. Instead article 6 of the 1953 AAL provides 
a general principle dealing with the law applicable to the effect of juristic acts, including contracts 
of sales of goods.  Article 6 stipulates, “the applicable law of the formation and effects of a 143
juridical act creating obligatory relations shall be determined by the parties’ intention”  – with 144
“juridical act” meaning “an act of which effects are created and shaped by the parties intentions.”  145
2.2.3 Current private international law position in Taiwan - AAL of 2010 
Since 1998, following long discussions and conducting of surveys, the Legislative Yuan of Taiwan 
issued implementation for a revision of the 1953 AAL on April 30th, 2010. The revised 2010 AAL 
was then passed and promulgated by the President on May 26th, 2010 and entered into force on 
May 26th 2011, replacing the 1953 AAL.  The enactment of the 2010 AAL is described as a huge 146
achievement reached in the development of Taiwan’s private international law as “it undoubtedly 
impressed on Taiwan’s efforts in reconsidering the original underlying policies and modernising its 
legislation after more than 60 years of implementation.”  The objective for the revision was to 147
reflect on and give effect to the subsequent developments found in “relevant academic theories and 
judicial practices in Taiwan [in order to bridge] the gaps between the local legal system and the 
foreign settings of national legislation and international conventions on private international 
law.”   148
 Article 8(2)  However, the contract is governed by the law of the State where the buyer has his place of business at 142
the time of conclusion of the contract, if -a) negotiations were conducted, and the contract concluded by and in the 
presence of the parties, in that State; or b) the contract provides expressly that the seller must perform his obligation to 
deliver the goods in that State; or c) the contract was concluded on terms determined mainly by the buyer and in 
response to an invitation directed by the buyer to persons invited to bid (a call for tenders).
 See n 122 above at 9.143
 Chen (n123) at 240.144
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2.2.4 Tacit choice of law in Taiwan 
As previously mentioned, due to Taiwan’s special status in the international domain, Taiwan is still 
not a member to most international conflicts conventions and organisations such as the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law. Nevertheless, “it should be noted that although some 
Hague Conventions cannot be directly applied….their spirit were introduced and exists in the 
provisions of the AAL of 2010.”  This closes the gap that exists in private international thinking 149
and converge schools of thought between Taiwan and the member states of such conventions.  150
The structure of the 2010 AAL with regards to choice of law clause is provided for in article 20(1) 
which stipulates that “the applicable law of the formation and effects of a juridical act from which 
obligatory relations result shall be determined by the parties’ intention.” This provision is similar to 
that of article 6 in the 1953 AAL. Article 20(2) provides, “[w]here there is no express intention of 
the parties or the express intention is void under the applicable law determined by the parties, they 
shall be governed by the law which is the most closely connected.” Article 20(3) states “where 
among the obligations resulted from a juridical act there is a characteristic one, the law of the 
domicile of the party who is to default on it at the time when the act was done shall be presumed as 
the law which is the most closely connected. However, where the subject matter of the juridical act 
is a real property, the law of the place where the real property is situated shall be presumed as the 
law which is the most closely connected.” It is clear from the provisions that “the expression of 
intention to choose applicable law was limited to explicit terms to give more room for the law of the 
closet connection.”   151
It is clearly demonstrated from the historical development of Taiwan’s private international law that, 
the principle of party autonomy is respected and given effect to in Taiwan. Like China, the current 
position in Taiwan’s private international law rules regarding choice of law is that parties have to 
expressly choose the applicable law to govern their contracts. Furthermore, Taiwan does not 
 Chen (n123) at 235. See also Girsberger, Kadner Graziano and Neels Choice of Law in International Commercial 149
Contracts – Global Perspectives on the Hague Principles (Forthcoming) at 41.21: “Prior to the 2010 amendment, the 
old provision concerning party autonomy did not make it clear in wording whether the tacit intentions were possible or 
not. Nevertheless, it was broadly accepted in academic views and in practice that party autonomy undoubtedly 
comprised tacit intentions.” However after the 2010 amendment there are now clear provisions provided on the matter 
of tacit choice of law and it can be fount is article 20(1) of the 2010 AAL.
 See n 149 above.150
 Chen (n123) at 241. See also Chen “Taiwan” 2017 Encyclopedia of Private International Law 2564.151
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recognise tacit choice of law. The current arrangement is that, as far as Taiwan’s private 
international law rules are concerned, parties are required to make their choice of law explicitly if 
they exercise their freedom to party autonomy. If such choice is not made expressly, the Taiwan 
courts will view it as an absence of choice in which the law of closest connection will be applied as 
the proper law of the contract.  
Chen commented on the position in Taiwan of choice of law in instances where the parties’ 
intention or agreement to choose the applicable law is absent or unclear.  He stated that the 1953 152
AAL constituted a “rigid approach” followed in Taiwan’s private’s international law which already 
set out the general rules for designating the applicable law.  This made it much easier for the 153
courts to determine what the applicable law was, however this meant that the “choice” of applicable 
law was already predetermined by the legislature which had “no close connection with the juridical 
act in question”.  Chen went on to say that the AAL of 2010 upheld party autonomy by changing 154
the method used in determining the applicable law when “the parties’ agreements or intentions 
cannot be proven”.  Article 20(2) determines that “where there is no express intention of the 155
parties or the express intention is void under the applicable law determined by the parties, they shall 
be governed by the law which is the most closely connected.” He further suggests that with the 
2010 AAL, it becomes apparent that the rigid rule is “replaced with the open-ended closest 
connection test.”  Nonetheless Chen acknowledges that this intention of choice of law is limited to 156
express terms in order to “give more room for the law of the closet connection” and “the criteria of 
‘characteristic performance’ were adopted as a prima facie rule in deciding the closest connection 
and the governing law.”  157
 Chen (n123) at 241.152
 See n 152 above. “When the intention of the parties is unknown, if both parties are of the same nationality, their 153
national law shall be applied; if they are of different nationalities, the law of the place where the act was done shall be 
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3. Possible influence of Article 4 of the Hague Principles if law reform is 
considered 
After exploring the non-recognition of tacit choice of law in China and Taiwan, consideration 
should be given to the possibility of a law reform in the private international law rules concerning 
the current position in the respective countries. If the Hague Principles are chosen as a possible 
model law to base such reformation on, then what are the possible considerations and factors that 
both countries would have to take into account in order to reformulate their private international law 
rules to properly accommodate for the recognition of tacit choice of law? 
The Hague Principles received high praise worldwide and is described as “a model for national, 
regional, supranational and international instruments”,  used “to interpret and supplement 158
domestic private international law rules, as well as regional, supranational and international 
instruments” to help develop the private international law of different countries.  Unlike the 1980 159
Rome Convention, the 1994 Mexico Convention, or the 2008 Rome I Regulation, the Hague 
Principles only deal with situations where parties have chosen a law either expressly or tacitly and 
does not deal with the law applicable in the absence of choice.   160
Article 4 of the Hague Principles provides for express and tacit choice. It stipulates that, “a choice 
of law, or any modification of a choice of law, must be made expressly or appear clearly from the 
provisions of the contract or the circumstances. An agreement between the parties to confer 
jurisdiction on a court or an arbitral tribunal to determine disputes under the contract is not in itself 
equivalent to a choice of law.”  
Choice of law can be expressed in a simple manner with parties simply stating that their agreement 
shall be governed by the law of country X. However, choice of law can also be complex in 
instances where parties to a contract fail to properly communicate or express their choice of 
applicable law. It has been said that, “not infrequently, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the 
adjudicator to draw the line—often thin—between a tacit choice of law and the absence of 
 Neels and Fredericks (n34) at 102.158
 See n 158 above.159
 Gama (n36) at 338.160
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choice.”  This is why countries who do consider and recognise tacit choice of law, are required to 161
provide guiding provisions on how to determine whether or not there exists a tacit choice of law. 
According to the Hague Principles it is required “that a tacit choice of law be clearly inferred from 
the real, as opposed to the presumed, intention of the parties.”   162
3.1 Level of strictness 
The level of strictness needs to be considered and it refers to the stringency of a provision which 
contains the instructions that are applicable for adjudicators, in order to determine the existence of 
tacit choice. Contained in article 4 of the Hague Principles the wording of the provision indicates a 
highly strict test as it requires the tacit choice of law to “appear clearly from the provisions of the 
contract or the circumstances.” Taken from the official commentary, this means that account must 
be taken to both the terms of the contract and the circumstances of the case, nevertheless the former 
or latter alone may also conclusively indicate a tacit choice.  In comparison to requiring the 163
choice to be “demonstrated with reasonable certainty” in article 3(1) of the 1980 Rome Convention, 
or simply “evident”, as contained in article 7 of the 1994 Mexico Convention, the Hague Principles 
adopt a strict criterion for the determination of tacit choice. This formulation was designed to leave 
very little room for a court to speculate and guesstimate whether or not there exists a tacit choice of 
law;  in addition, it assist in the promotion of “predictability and legal certainty in the decision-164
making process, preventing agreements from being deduced without proper support from the terms 
of the contract or the circumstances.”   165
There is support for this strictness since it would be granting too much discretion to allow courts to 
readily deduce tacit agreements.  This in turn would invite and lead to unpredictability in case 166
decisions and undermine the legal uncertainty of the conflicts rule that applies in the absence of a 
choice of law.  167
 See n 39 above.161
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3.2 Indicating factors of a tacit choice  
In the search for determining whether or not a tacit choice of law exists a court may refer to either 
the actual provisions contained in the contract and the circumstances surrounding the case such as 
the parties conduct or behaviour.  It has been vouched that there is no reason to limit these 168
indiciae of tacit choice of law to only that of the provisions of the contract when consideration can 
also be taken of the “circumstances of the case.”  169
Choice of court provisions contained in contracts are often confused by courts with choice of law 
clauses. Article 4 of the Hague Principles clearly stipulates that a choice of court clause or an 
arbitration agreement is not, in itself, equivalent to a choice of law: “An agreement between the 
parties to confer jurisdiction on a court or an arbitral tribunal to determine disputes under the 
contract is not in itself equivalent to a choice of law.“  Thus entailing that choice of court and 170
choice of law provisions are mutually exclusive and separate issues.  The reason for this is 171
because a court or forum may be selected for reasons such as its neutrality or expertise in the 
handling of certain matters and not for its domestic law.  Thus various authors have agreed that 172
choice of court provisions alone should not be a conclusive indicator of the existence of a tacit 
choice.  Nevertheless, “the Hague Principles provision asserts that a choice-of-forum clause may 173
be one among other contract terms to be taken into consideration in determining the law tacitly 
chosen by the parties.”  174
Other indicating factors where choice of law may be inferred, as provided by the Giuliano and 
Lagarde Report include:  (1) The use of standard form which is known to be governed by a 175
 Neels and Fredericks (n34) at 106 - 107.168
 Neels and Fredericks (n34) at 107 and Bowers (n28) at 177.169
 Gama (n36) at 346.170
 Neels and Fredericks (n34) at 107.171
 Neels and Fredericks (n34) at 107-108.172
 Neels and Fredericks (n34) at 108.173
 Gama (n36) at 347.174
 Bouwers (n28) at 172. See also the Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations by 175
Giuliano and Lagarde 1980 Official Journal C-282/01.
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particular system of law; (2) where parties have had previous dealings under similar contracts 
containing an express choice of law which has been omitted from the existing contract; (3) choice 
of a particular form; (4) reference to specific provisions of a particular legal system contained in the 
contract; and (5) choice of a particular place of arbitration. Other factors that may be added include: 
(6) Common residence or domicile of the parties; (7) place of performance of the contract; and (8) 
from the several possible systems that could apply, that system which will give effect to the 
contract. The legal terminology employed by the parties,  and the currency in which payment is to 176
be made,  can also be considered as sources of inference. 177
3.3 Considering the Hague Principles 
After looking at the Hague Principles and analysing the possible considerations and factors that 
China and Taiwan would have to take into account, in order to reformulate their private 
international rules, both countries could simply just add the contents contained in article 4 of the 
Hague Principles since the Hague Principles are considered as the current best practice. Under the 
Hague Principles in respect of tacit choice of law adjudicating judges and arbitrators are given a 
wider range of elements, both subjective and objective in order to assist in the determining of the 
real intent of parties to a commercial contract.  Something noticeable about Article 4 of the Hague 178
Principles is that, in practice, it hardly finds application and has been described as very difficult to 
operate since there are very little number of cases in which either the courts or arbitral tribunals are 
faced with a case concerning a choice of law by implication.  For this reason, we reach the crux of 179
this analysis which is to determine whether the recognition of tacit choice of law is still relevant in 
theory and practice by analysing the pros and cons to tacit choice of law.  
 Turkiye Bankasi AS v Bank of China 1993 1 LLR 132 (QB Commercial Court, 8–9 September 1992).176
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4. Theoretical arguments pro et contra the recognition of tacit choice of law 
Following the in depth discussion of tacit choice of law, an analysis concerning the advantages and 
disadvantages with regards to the recognition of tacit choice of law will now be explored and 
discussed. 
A pro aspect lies in the commendable and praiseworthy efforts given behind the recognition of tacit 
choice of law in respect of choice of law clauses, as it is an attempt to respect and accept the 
doctrine of party autonomy. Countries displaying such determined attempt to uphold this doctrine 
have shown and helped emphasise the importance of this principle as it should be. As previously 
shown, the principle of party autonomy can potentially act as a catch-all principle that private 
parties or entities can rely on in instances where the public international law aspect could pose as a 
potential hinderance in private law dealings. Thus parties can utilise the principle of party autonomy 
in its capacity as a fundamental value in contract law and in private international law to select what 
court has jurisdiction and more importantly, which law is the applicable law to govern the contract 
in the event of a dispute. This not only helps harmonise and unify how international commercial 
contracts are to be handled, which helps create predictability, but also assists in administering 
certainty.   
However, this approach of tacit choice of law taken, in reality, tarnishes and undermines the 
principle of party autonomy more than it does upholding it. The reason for this argument is because 
tacit choice of law is extremely difficult to infer when the parties have not properly recorded their 
intentions in their contract.  Due to this difficulty, what ends up happening is that courts then 180
make inferences of whether or not the actual intention exists based on “assumptions that may or 
may not be correct.”  Making guesses as to whether a tacit choice of law agreement exists or not 181
can also give rise to uncertainty and unpredictability. This seems rather counter-intuitive in contract 
law and contrary to the doctrine of principle of party autonomy, which many countries have sworn 
to uphold. Instead the courts should simply ask the parties to clarify what their real intentions were 
instead of making guesses and inferences of what the parties real intention was. By allowing the 
parties the opportunity to clarify which choice of law they made would be much more procedurally 
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cost and time efficient for all parties involved, especially for merchants and traders who favour 
speedy litigation so as to return to their business affairs.  
It has been argued by various academic authors that, “it is necessary to recognise that sometimes the 
implied choice does exist in commercial practice, especially between parties with a long-term 
business relationship. Parties may have concluded a few similar contracts in the past and their new 
contract will simply provide some new terms without repeating everything that has been discussed 
before. If the parties have negotiated choice of law in their earlier contracts, it is reasonable to argue 
that they also have the common intention of applying the same law in the current contract. Refusing 
to recognise the implied choice is sometimes incompatible with commercial practice”.  However, 182
the exclusion of tacit choice of law in China “may help reduce uncertainty in litigation and save the 
parties’ time and cost in arguing the likely tacit choice.”  The non-recognition of tacit choice of 183
law displayed in China and Taiwan, forces parties to commercial contracts to exercise their freedom 
of party autonomy, within its limits subject to overriding provisions and public policy. This in turn 
gives rise to certainty and predictability that choices made by parties are respected, as well as 
making the litigation much more efficient if courts apply the law chosen by parties and avoiding 
unnecessary procedural costs and time wasted.  
This more viable approach enables different States to encourage and inform private individuals and 
entities, who want to enter into commercial transactions, to utilise their right or freedom to party 
autonomy in their choice of law provisions. Why this is said to be viable is because once parties 
know that they are required to select an applicable law to their contract or make any changes to 
their contract explicitly, any failure on their end to properly express this right after knowing the fact, 
gives the courts a lesser burden to bear as to the affecting consequences on the parties reasonable 
expectations.  In other words, parties cannot complain about undesirable consequences that result 184
from the objective determination of applicable law when the parties themselves failed to properly 
apply their freedom to select a governing law. In vouching for this approach by different States, it 
can assist in the harmonisation of international commercial law and instil legal certainty and 
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predictability in this field of law which already has a very fickle and volatile nature as it is 
constantly evolving and adapting to the globalised needs of businesses and traders.  
30
5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, there is room for the continuance of non-recognition of tacit choice of law. In 
practice, tacit choice of law can potentially be very difficult to prove especially since it depends on 
which State an international commercial contractual case ends up in. This is because different States 
all over the world have diverging and different manners of approaching tacit choice of law rules in 
terms of their own private international law rules. This in itself proves to be a potential burden for 
private parties to an international commercial contract. That is why there is viable reason for States 
to support the approach of inciting parties to exercise their freedom to party autonomy by means of 
non-recognition of tacit choice of law.  
However, if States choose to keep recognising tacit choice of law rules, it would be best for them to 
develop those rules according to the model law provided by the Hague Principles. This much 
stricter model attempts to place stricter tests for courts so as to prevent the mishaps that could 
potentially go wrong in respect of tacit choice of law cases, which may lead to unappealing 
consequences on the parties reasonable expectation.  The truth is that different States around the 185
world are Members to different Conventions,  which all contain different, diverging rules dealing 186
with tacit choice of law. This divergence can prove to be more harmful to the objective in private 
international law to harmonise and unify rules. Due to this very reason there have been academic 
writings containing suggestions and contributions by academic authors on the role of the Hague 
Principles in the revision of certain private international law conventions regarding choice of law.  187
Thus the Hague Principles have become a model law put forward to encourage and push towards 
harmonisation and convergence on rules relating to choice of law. 
China and Taiwan, have both gone through lengthy changes in their historical development of 
private international law and relationship regarding the doctrine of party autonomy, which has 
ultimately lead to their current position where both countries give full recognition to the principle of 
party autonomy as well as choice of law agreements. The only exception being that such choice of 
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law must be made expressly and there is no recognition of tacit choice of law. In addition, if there is 
no indication of express choice of law, the objective proper law still finds use as a competent 
reinforcement in the form of absence of choice. The main point of express choice of law is to make 
such processes quicker and more efficient, thus curbing the tedious processes of looking into 
connecting factors. 
Thus far, the non-recognition of tacit choice of law seems to have demonstrated far more 
advantages than disadvantages. As previously mentioned, the procedural costs that goes into the 
determination of the existence of choice of law by means of tacit choice of law, in cases that deal 
with commercial contracts, can be very time and money consuming. This is unappealing for 
international traders and merchants as time is money for businesses all around the world. The non-
recognition of tacit choice of law stance held by China and Taiwan forces parties to a contract, that 
may potentially involve elements of  China or Taiwan, to utilise their freedom of party autonomy to 
its full potential, subject to certain limits, so that such choices shall be upheld and given effect to if 
it reaches any court around the world, thus giving full effect to the principle of party autonomy. 
Express choice of law is much more efficient and effective compared to tacit choice of law. 
Furthermore, rules regarding modification of choice of law are complementary to systems that do 
not recognise tacit choice, as it is much more logical to ask parties to clarify their real intentions by 
modifying their contract to include their express choice of law, thus there is no need to make 
guesstimates or assumptions by courts as to what the parties real intention may have been. This 
gives life to the expression, “straight from the horse’s mouth”, where parties to a commercial 
contract can express themselves fully and clearly, leaving no room for uncertainty or 
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